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DIGGING FOR GOLD: THE NINTH CIRCUIT CATCHES THE
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WITH ITS FINGER UP THE
EPA'S NOSE IN SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION
COUNCIL V U.S. ARMY CORPS OFENGINEERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2008, the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to determine the fate of a proposed Alaskan gold mine.1 The mining company appealed a Ninth
Circuit Court decision forcing the mine to alter its planned method
for disposing of mining waste product.2 Several environmental
groups responded, citing the harmful effects of a reversal, both on
a natural Alaskan lake and on the inviolability of the federal Clean
3
Water Act (CWA or the Act).
Southeast Alaska is known for its glacier-cut fjords and beautiful rainforests. 4 The region's main industries are fishing, tourism
6
and logging, 5 but the area is also home to the Juneau Gold Belt.
This 120-mile stretch has hosted major gold mining initiatives since
7
the nineteenth century.
1. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d
638 (9th Cir. 2007) cert. granted sub nom. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 128 S.Ct 2995 (U.S.June 27, 2008) (granting certiorari to hear noted
case). For a discussion of the implications of the Supreme Court's decision, see
infra notes 202-24 and accompanying text.
2. See Max Schwartz, ScotusWiki Preview: Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council, and Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, SCOTUSBLOC, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/scotuswiki-preview-coeuralaska-inc-v-southeast-alaska-conservation-council-and-aaska-v-southeast-aaska-conservation-council/
(discussing reasons petitioners appealed Ninth Circuit's
decision).
3. See id. (discussing points of contention in noted case).
4. See Southeast Alaska: Overview, http://www.usd.edu/esci/alaska/intro.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (discussing elements of natural beauty in Southeast
Alaska).
5. See State of Alaska Visitor Page, http://www.state.ak.us/local/
visitorHome.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (citing major industries in Alaska).
6. See Beth Leibowitz, Note, The New Gold Rush: Mine Tailings in Southeast
Alaska and Perversion of the Clean WaterAct, 27 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 919, 919 (1994)
(describing geography ofJuneau Gold Belt in Southeast Alaska). Southeast Alaska
is the panhandle region where the state borders Canada. See also Mining Activities,
http://www.seacc.org/issues/mining/mining-activities.jpg (last visited Feb. 19,
2009) (displaying aerial map of Southeast Alaska with current mine sites
highlighted).
7. See Coeur Alaska, Mining & Milling, http://www.kensingtongold.com/mining.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Mining & Milling] (describing rich
mining history of Southeast Alaska).

(307)
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While most of the Juneau Gold Belt has been inactive since the
early twentieth century, plans to reopen several mine sites emerged
in the 1990s. 8 To open the mines, mining companies must apply

for, and be granted, permits by government agencies. 9 In order to
dispose of mining waste product into Southeast Alaska's numerous
lakes and bodies of water, companies must obtain permits in accordance with the federal CWA. 10 Yet, novel mining technologies and
the physical geography of Southeast Alaska pose unique problems
for mining companies applying for permits."
Since its inception in 1973, the CWA has presented both courts
and agency administrators with problems of interpretation. 1 2 The
CWA grants the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps or the Corps) administrative powers to issue permits to applicants proposing certain
13
activities that will likely affect the nation's waters.
The Ninth Circuit is the most recent court to rule on an alleged ambiguity in the CWA. 14 In Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council v. US. Army Corps of Engineers (Southeast Alaska), 15 the court
held the Corps could not classify mining waste product as "fill material" and issue a permit to dispose of the waste into an Alaskan

8. See Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 919 (discussing plans to reopen two Southeast Alaska gold mines). Mining companies proposed to restore the Alaska-Juneau
mine site and the Kensington mine site in the early 1990s. Id. at 921. These proposals were subject to similar interagency disputes between the EPA and U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and the dispute at issue in the noted case. See id. at 921-22
(discussing how agencies resolved dispute in early 1990s by determining proposals
did not fall under CWA).
9. See Alaska Department of Natural Resources: Division of Mining, Land &
Water, Large Mine Projects, http://www.dnr.state.ak.us/mlw/mining/largemine/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (discussing permit procedures for large mine
projects in Alaska).
10. See TOM CRAFFORD, ALASKA DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, THE PROCESS

19-22 (2008),
http://www.dnr.state.ak.us/mlw/mining/largemine/may5pptcolor6.pdf (stating
federal requirements for gaining mining permits in Alaska).
11. See Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 919-22 (discussing difficulties Alaskan valleys and wetlands pose for mine tailings disposal).
12. See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REv. 537, 538-39 (2004) (stating difficulties commentators have
with Clean Water Act).
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (giving EPA jurisdiction); § 1344 (giving
Corps jurisdiction). For a further discussion of the agencies' permitting powers,
AND REQUIREMENTS FOR LARGE MINE PERMIT APPLICATIONS IN ALASKA

see infra notes 66-91.

14. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d 638,
654-55 (9th Cir. 2007) (resolving question created by ambiguity in CWA).
15. 486 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2007).
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lake. 16 The court found the permit unlawful because the EPA ex17
pressly prohibited the particular discharge.
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit's decision in Southeast
Alaska as the case reaches the Supreme Court.1 8 Section II summarizes the relevant facts surrounding the mining proposal and the
procedural history of the case.' 9 Section III provides necessary
background to the component parts of the CWA at issue. 20 Section
IV summarizes the Ninth Circuit's decision. 2 1 Section V of this
Note critiques the Southeast Alaska opinion and asserts that the
Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the CWA. 22 Finally, Section VI
discusses the importance of the case on CWA litigation and examines the possible consequences if the Supreme Court chooses to
23
reverse.
II.

FACTS

Coeur Alaska (Coeur), a mining company specializing in precious metals, constructed the Kensington Gold Mine in Southeast
Alaska. 24 The Kensington mine will be entirely subterranean, located on the site of a previous gold mine that operated from 1897
to 1928.25 Coeur is building the mill at the site of the prior mine
for both convenience and to improve overall efficiency. 26 Current

16. See id. at 655 (holding Corps improperly permitted discharge). For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's holding, see infra notes 104-45 and accompanying text.
17. See id. (determining Corps violated CWA by granting permit for activity
specifically prohibited by EPA regulation).
18. See id. (discussing holding on issue before court).
19. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history in Southeast Alaska, see
infra notes 24-59 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the component parts of the CWA and relevant precedent at issue in Southeast Alaska, see infra notes 60-103 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Southeast Alaska, see infra
notes 104-45 and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of the holding in Southeast Alaska, see infra notes 146204 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the impact of the holding in Southeast Alaska, see infra
notes 204-27 and accompanying text.
24. See Mining & Milling, supra note 7 (discussing construction of Kensington
Gold Mine in Southeast Alaska).
25. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,486 F.3d 638,
641 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing Coeur's plans to open Kensington mine at site of
former gold mine).
26. See Mining & Milling, supra note 7 (giving reasons why Coeur chose to use
Kensington site).
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plans call for the mine to operate for approximately ten to fifteen
27
years.
To mine the gold, Coeur will employ an on-site froth-flotation
plant. 28 The froth-flotation mill is an alternative mining technology

to the more typical cyanide-based method. 29 Rock containing gold
ore is transported from the mine to the mill, where the rock is
crushed and ground before entering a tank and going through the
30
froth-flotation process.
Ninety-five percent of the ore that is originally placed in the
froth-flotation mill will not contain any gold.3 1 Once the ore is
processed and the gold is removed, the leftover rock becomes
residual waste, otherwise known as "tailings," and requires disposal.3 2 Kensington plans to replace forty percent of the tailings as

backfill for the mine.3 3 The other sixty percent will be deposited
34
into a local body of water, Lower Slate Lake.

27. See id. (discussing Coeur's plans to keep Kensington mine in operation for
ten to fifteen years).
28. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 641 (explaining Coeur's plans to implement froth-flotation mill at Kensington mine).
29. See Mining & Milling, supra note 7 (explaining froth-flotation mill does
not use cyanide or other harsh chemicals typical of mining). Coeur Alaska believes
that froth-flotation is an environmentally safer option to cyanide mining. Id. The
controversy surrounding the case, however, stems from an EPA regulation declaring wastewater from froth-flotation facilities unsafe, and thereby prohibiting the
discharge of such wastewater into the nation's navigable waters. Ore Mining and
Dressing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. pt. 440.104(b) (1) (2008). For further
discussion of the EPA regulation and its effect on the case, see infra notes 66-91
and accompanying text.
30. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 641 (explaining froth-flotation process
planned to be used at Kensington). When the rock is ground fine enough, it is
placed inside the froth-flotation tank. Id. Next, water and enabling chemicals are
added. Id. Finally, air is pumped into the tank. Id. Pockets of air form inside the
solution and these bubbles attach to gold deposits. Id. The bubbles then rise to
the top of the tank, carrying the gold with it. Id. The bubbles pop at the surface of
the tank and gold forms a froth layer at the top, which is skimmed out and preserved. Id.
31. See id. (describing statistics representing how much gold can actually be
retrieved in gold mining process).
32. See Coeur Alaska, Environment, http://www.kensingtongold.com/environment.html (last visitedJan. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Coeur Alaska Env't] (defining
tailings' environmental impact on Southeast Alaska).
33. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 641 (explaining Coeur's plans for excess
tailings).
34. See Coeur Alaska Env't, supra note 32 (explaining how excess tailings will
be deposited into Lower Slate Lake).
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Kensington plans to process 2,000 tons of ore each day;3 5 of
this, only 100 tons will contain economically viable gold. 3 6 This

means that 1,440 tons of tailings will be deposited into Lower Slate
Lake each day. 37 Kensington intends to use a slurry, comprising
forty-five percent water and fifty-five percent tailings, to transport
the tailings into the bottom of Lower Slate Lake.3 8 Over the course
of the ten to fifteen year life of the mine, 4.5 million tons of tailings
39
will funnel through the slurry into the bottom of the lake.

Originally, Coeur planned to construct a dry-mining facility
that did not require the use of Lower Slate Lake. 40 Coeur Alaska
obtained permits for the Kensington Gold Mine from both the EPA
and the Corps under the initial dry tailings plan. 41 The price of
gold dropped, however, forcing Coeur to look for a less expensive
mining method. 42 After studying the local geography, Coeur decided that conveying the slurry into Lower Slate Lake would be the
43
most economically viable method for depositing the wet tailings.
After revising the mining plans, Coeur resubmitted its proposal
to the appropriate agencies in order to gain permits. 44 The Forest
35. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 641 (providing specific facts regarding
amount of ore processed per day).
36. See id. (explaining most ore processed in froth-flotation mill will not contain useful gold).
37. See id. at 642 (explaining environmental effects on Lower Slate Lake).
38. See id. (describing slurry that will carry tailings from froth-flotation mill to
Lower Slate Lake).
39. See id. (explaining specific effects mining will have on Lower Slate Lake).
The bottom of Lower Slate Lake will rise fifty feet, to its current high water mark.
Id. Additionally, the lake will nearly triple in surface area. Id. Because of the
impact of the slurry and the discharge of the tailings, all fish and aquatic life in
Lower Slate Lake would be killed. Id. Initially, the pH level for the water in the
lake will rise to an alkalinity level greater than ten. Id. The toxicity of the discharge may have lasting effects on Lower Slate Lake. Id.
40. See Coeur Alaska Env't, supra note 32 (explaining original plans to construct dry-mining facility). The tailings under this alternate plan would be "dried
and stacked on the ground" instead of in Lower Slate Lake, but this option "was
not selected . . . due to increased wetland impacts, logistics, and cost." Id.
41. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 641 (describing permits involved in
Coeur's original plan for Kensington Gold Mine); see also Coeur Alaska Env't, supra
note 32 (explaining additional factors beyond economic reasons why Kensington
discarded dry tailing plan). Coeur submits the plan for tailings disposal in Lower
Slate Lake is "the best and only option," citing factors such as the impact on Alaskan wetlands and the confused logistics of a dry tailings plan, in addition to the
cost factor. Id.
42. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 641 (explaining why Coeur did not follow
through with dry mining plan).
43. See Coeur Alaska Env't, supra note 32 (explaining how slurry is most appropriate method for disposing of tailings created at gold mine).
44. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 642 (describing permitting process for
new froth-flotation proposal).
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Service issued a permit approving the wet tailings plan on December 9, 2004. 45 The Corps took jurisdiction of the proposal over the

EPA, believing the scheme fell under the CWA's Section 404 permitting system because the bottom elevation of Lower Slate Lake
46
would rise fifty feet.

On June 17, 2005, the Corps issued a permit to Coeur, authorizing the Kensington Gold Mine to deposit tailings into Lower Slate
Lake. 47 While the Corps approved Coeur's plan to dump the chemically processed tailings into the lake, the permit required Coeur to
mitigate the environmental impact when the mine ceased
48
production.
After the Corps granted the Kensington permit, the Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council (SEACC) quickly filed a lawsuit challenging the permit under the CWA. 49 SEACC is a local environ-

mental organization committed to preserving Alaska's natural
environment and resources. 50 Following the lawsuit, the Corps suspended its permit and ordered Coeur to postpone operations of
the Kensington Gold Mine. 5 1 After nearly a year of research and
studies, the Corps reinstated its permit without change on March
53
29, 2006.52 SEACC then filed an amended complaint.

45. See id. (stating Forest Service quickly granted approval for new plan in
Record of Decisions).
46. See id. (explaining why Corps believed it had jurisdiction to grant permit
instead of EPA). For further information regarding the Corps' permitting responsibilities, see infra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
47. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 642 (discussing Corps' approval of proposal for Kensington Gold Mine).
48. See id. (describing special conditions Corps attached to permit when considering Kensington proposal). Under the Corps' permit, Coeur was required to
install a cap of indigenous material over the tailings at the floor of the lake, as well
as "reintroduce native fish species back into the lake and monitor the health of the
ecosystem." Id. All of the environmental conditions would only be required when
all mining activity ceased. Id.
49. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 643 (describing environmental groups'
disapproval of proposed Kensington mine).
50. See Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, About Us, http://seacc.org/
about (last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (explaining goals of organization). SEACC purports to work with local member groups and communities in Southeast Alaska in
protecting habitats for fish and wildlife and reducing the amount of clearing in the
Tongass National Forest. Id.
51. See id. (describing Corps' actions after receiving complaint regarding Kensington Gold Mine).
52. See News Release, Coeur D'Alene, Coeur Notified of Reinstated Permit at
Kensington Gold Mine (March 30, 2006), available at http://www.kensingtongold.
com/documents/Kensington2006330.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (explaining
Corps reinstated permit for Kensington Gold Mine).
53. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 643 (describing SEACC's action after
Corps reinstated permit for Kensington Gold Mine).
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At trial, the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendant Corps in an opinion rendered on August 4, 2006.54 The
district court confirmed that Section 404 was the applicable CWA
55
provision because the permit involved the disposal of fill material.
As a result, the district court concluded that CWA Sections 301 (e)
and 306(e) were inapplicable to the Section 404 permit
56
procedure.
SEACC appealed that decision on August 7, 2006, claiming the
district court erred in its interpretation of the CWA. 57 SEACC's
core argument was that the Corps did not have jurisdiction to issue
the permit because the tailings constituted a prohibited effluent
from a froth-flotation facility. 58 Consequently, Section 402 and the

EPA should have governed the permitting proposal and the permit
59
should have been denied.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Clean Water Act
1. Purpose

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to remedy a growing
pollution problem in the nation's waters. 60 The CWA's stated objective is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. ' 61 First enacted in 1972, the
Act set a lofty "national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."62 Further, Congress
sought to achieve "water quality which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife... and recreation in
'63
and on the water.
54. See id. (describing procedural history of noted case).
55. See id. (explaining trial court's reasons for granting summary judgment to

Corps).
56. See id. (stating trial court's reason for concluding Corps properly granted
permit for Kensington Gold Mine). For a further discussion of the relationship
between the component parts of the CWA, see infra notes 60-91 and accompanying
text.
57. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 643 (explaining why SEACC appealed district court ruling).
58. See id. (stating issues before court on appeal from district court's
decision).
59. See id. (stating SEACC's issues on appeal).
60. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2006) (introducing reasons for enacting Clean
Water Act).
61. Id. (explaining congressional objective for enacting CWA).
62. Id. § 1251(a) (1).

63. Id. § 1251 (a) (2).
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In the thirty-seven years since Congress enacted the CWA, strict
enforcement by the EPA, the Corps and the federal courts have
made the CWA a material success. 64 The Act places exacting limitations on all effluent discharges not in compliance with the CWA,
and courts have considered these limitations the "cornerstone of
65
the act."
2.

The EPA and NPDES

The CWA attempts to govern effluent discharges using a permit program, essentially creating a standardized regulatory program governed by both the EPA and the Corps. 6 6 The EPA has
jurisdiction over all permits relating to the discharge of pollutants. 67 The EPA may issue permits through the National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), but only for those appli68
cants in compliance with Sections 301 and 306 of the CWA.

Section 301 of the CWA governs effluent limitations, stating
that, save for the enumerated exceptions in the CWA itself, "the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 6 9 Section 301, together with Section 306, requires that the administrators
of both the EPA and the Corps jointly establish national performance standards for effluent discharges. 70 In 1982, the EPA used its
power, granted by Sections 301, 306 and 402, to promulgate a new
standard of performance for froth-flotation facilities. 7 1 This performance standard prohibits a froth-flotation mill from discharging
72
its process wastewater into waters of the United States.
64. See Andreen, supra note 12, at 537 (explaining effects CWA has had on
environment since enactment).
65. See Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, & Toten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc.,
299 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing importance of CWA's effluent
limitations).
66. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (granting certain permitting powers to EPA); § 1344
(granting certain permitting powers to Corps).
67. See id. § 1342 (describing EPA's permitting powers for all proposed effluent discharges).
68. See id. (describing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Standards system that helps govern EPA permit decisions).
69. Id. § 1311 (regulating discharge of pollutants).
70. See id. § 1311 (e) (requiring all effluent limitations created under the CWTA
be applied to all point sources); § 1316 (making it unlawful for any new point
source owner to operate in violation of published standards of performance).
71. See Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. pt.
440.104(b) (1) (2008) (creating new source performance standard for froth-flotation mills).
72. See id. (forbidding discharge of process wastewater from froth-flotation
mills into navigable waters).
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3.

The Corps and "FillMaterial"

The CWA grants the Corps jurisdiction to issue permits to all
applicants who propose to discharge dredged or fill material under
Section 404. 7 3 "Discharge of dredged material" has a fairly broad
definition, covering the "addition of dredged material... into the
waters of the United States. ' 74 Section 404 also provides for explicit

exceptions
practices.

75

to

effluent

limitations

for

certain

enumerated

Typical mining operations produce the type of fill within the
Corps' permitting power, 7 6 and the Corps frequently authorizes
mining facilities to discharge tailings into navigable waters. 77 The
Corps' power becomes ambiguous, however, when asked to provide
permits for fill that qualifies as an effluent otherwise controlled by
the EPA.

4.

78

A History of Confusion

The actual interplay between the EPA and the Corps has produced a tangled history. 79 Much of the confusion revolves around
the organizations' evolving definitions of the term "fill material." 80
Appearing first in the 1975 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the
Corps initially defined "fill material" according to an effects-based
73. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (outlining Corps' permitting powers under CWA).
The Corps is given authority solely for discharges of fill material into the nation's
navigable waters. Id. For a discussion regarding what constitutes as a discharge of
fill material, see infra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
74. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material Into Waters of the
United States, 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2(d)(1) (2008) (defining 'discharge of fill
material').
75. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (providing for exceptions to effluent limitations).
The named exceptions do not include mining. Id. The Corps does frequently
issue mining permits, however. See, e.g., Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v.
Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing Corps-granted permit for
coal mining proposal). The typical mining permit authorized by the Corps relates
strictly to the discharge of fill material and does not include fill that doubles as an
effluent. See id. at 431 (discussing typical permitting schemes).
76. See Kentuckians, 317 F.3d at 425 (discussing Corps' permitting power).
The fill at issue in Kentuckians included tailings produced at a coal mining facility.
Id. The Corps approved a plan where the tailings filled a valley that constituted a
wetland under the CWA. Id. (discussing Corps' approved plan). For a further discussion of the ruling in Kentuckians,see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g.,
id. (authorizing mining tailings to be deposited as fill into wetland
valley).
78. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,486 F.3d 638,
644 (9th Cir. 2007) (examining interpretation problems caused by ambiguity in
CWA).
79. See id. (describing jurisdictional overlap created for fill material that
doubles as effluent).
80. See id. at 650 (explaining history of agencies' 'fill material' definitions).
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test, referring to "any pollutant used to create fill in the traditional
sense of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the

bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose." 8' The EPA
eventually adopted this same effects-based test.82 In 1977, however,

the Corps altered its definition to a purpose-based test.83 The
Corps reasoned that too many waste materials technically fit within
the fill material definition but were intended to fall under NPDES
regulations, and ultimately the EPA should be granting those
permits.

84

In 1986, the EPA and the Corps released a formal Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outlining the official procedures for
regulating industrial pollutants. 85 Under the MOA, the EPA now
regulates all industrial pollutants under Section 402, while the
Corps grants permits for fill materials that either replace portions
of water with dry land or change the bottom elevation of any body
of water in the United States by any amount. 86 Accordingly, both
the Corps and EPA adopted a joint regulatory definition of "fill material," using the MOA guidelines to supplement the Corps' origi87
nal effects-based test.
Under the new agreement, mine tailings are generally considered a discharge of fill material, thereby requiring a permit from
the Corps. 88 When tailings from mining-related activities are deposited into the navigable waters of the United States, however,
they may also constitute effluent for which the EPA has sole juris81. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
31,320, 31,325 (July 25, 1975) (defining fill material).
82. See Discharge of Dredged or Fill Material, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,298
(Sept. 5, 1975) (adopting effects-based test for EPA).
83. See Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122,
37,145 (July 19, 1977) (changing Corps' definition of fill material to purpose-based
test).
84. See id. at 37,130 (explaining why Corps changed definition of "fill
material").
85. See Water Pollution Control; Memorandum of Agreement on Solid Waste,
51 Fed. Reg. 8,871, 8,171 (Mar. 14, 1986) (outlining Memorandum of Agreement
between EPA and Corps regarding regulation of "fill material").
86. See Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of "Fill
Material" and "Discharge of Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129-01, 31,135 (May 9,
2002) (explaining separation of permitting powers between EPA and Corps under
Memorandum of Agreement).
87. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material Into Waters of the
United States, 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2(e) (reciting EPA definition); 404 Program Definitions; Exempt Activities Not Requiring 404 Permits, 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.2 (reciting
Corps definition). Similarly, the agencies defined 'discharge of fill material' in 33
C.F.R. pt. 323.2(f) (EPA definition) and 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.2 (Corps definition).
88. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (explaining Corps permitting powers).
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diction. 89 For instance, the EPA's regulation prohibiting the process wastewater of froth-flotation mills from entering the nation's
waters remains ambiguous regarding whether such process wastewater could be permitted under the Corps' Section 404 power
when the discharge doubles as fill material. 90 This situation is the
source of the controversy in Southeast Alaska, where environmental
groups challenged the Corps' authority to issue a permit for the
discharge of fill material when the material also constituted an effluent expressly prohibited by the EPA. 9 1
B.

Cases Interpreting the Clean Water Act

While there is confusion at the administrative level, the issue in
92
Southeast Alaska remains a question of first instance for the courts.
Additionally, major case law discussing the CWA provides modest
relevance in assessing this ambiguity. 93 There is no precedential
case precisely on point, however, meaning the Ninth Circuit had
94
little help in reaching its determination in Southeast Alaska.
1.

Rapanos v. United States

Most recently, the Supreme Court decided in Rapanos v. United
States (Rapanos)9 5 that permits need not be issued for the discharge
of fill material into non-navigable waters. 96 This is instructive for
cases where mining operations create dams and man-made ponds,
which do not constitute navigable waters. 97 This ruling holds little
89. Compare id. § 1342 (granting EPA ability to create new source performance standards for effluents under NPDES) with id. § 1344 (granting Corps permittingjurisdiction for proposals involving discharge of fill material).
90. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,486 F.3d 638,
644-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing which agency has permitting jurisdiction when
effluent also constitutes fill material).
91. See id. at 644 (stating controversy at issue).
92. See Schwartz, supra note 2 (discussing lack of split among circuit courts on
issue).
93. For a discussion of CWA case law and the relevance of the cases, see infra
notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
94. SeeJoshua A. Bloom, What's Next After Rapanos?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Summer 2007, at 13, 13 (discussing major Supreme Court decisions regarding interpretation of CWA).
95. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
96. Id. at 757 (holding CWA inapplicable for waters not classified as 'navigable waters of the United States').
97. See id. at 719-23 (discussing facts at issue in Rapanos). The facts at issue
differ greatly from those in Southeast Alaska, most notably because Southeast Alaska
deals with a proposal for dumping tailings into a lake that clearly constitutes navigable water. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 642 (giving physical characteristics of
Lower Slate Lake).
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value for discerning proper law, however, when mining corporations plan to discharge tailings into waters that are indisputably
navigable. 98
2. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Riverburgh
Additionally, mining overburden that is used to fill streams is
considered within the Corps' jurisdiction. 99 In Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Riverburgh (Kentuckians),°100 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that coal mining overburden had the effect
of replacing United States waters with dry land, and should thereby
be governed under Section 404 of the CWA. l0 1 Overburden, like
tailings, is listed specifically in the CFR as an example of a material
included under the term "discharge of fill material." 10 2 The Fourth
Circuit allowed the Corps to grant permits for the discharge of fill
10 3
material, but specifically excluded fill that amounted to effluent.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

The issue before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Southeast Alaska was whether the EPA or the Corps had authority under
the CWA to issue permits to Coeur Alaska for it's proposed Kensington Gold Mine.' 0 4 The Corps believed that the CFR definition
of "fill material" granted it permitting power because the Kensington proposal would raise the bottom elevation of Lower Slate
Lake. 10 5 Conversely, SEACC and other appellants urged the court
to focus on a different section of the CFR, which would prohibit
discharging the process wastewater of froth-flotation mills into wa06
ters of the United States.
98. See Bloom, supra note 94, at 13-16 (discussing how Rapanos applies to future cases).
99. See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 448
(4th Cir. 2003) (holding Corps acted within power in issuing permit for discharge
of coal mining overburden).
100. 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003).
101. See id. (holding Corps' 404 permitting procedure governed facts in
Kentuckians).
102. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material Into Waters of the
United States, 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2(e) (2008) (listing examples of what constitutes
'fill material').
103. See Kentuckians, 317 F.3d at 448 (recognizing right of EPA to control effluent that might otherwise fall within Corps' fill material permitting capabilities).
104. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d
638, 644 (9th Cir. 2007) (reporting conflicting regulations at issue in case).
105. See id. (describing possible interpretation that would grant Corps jurisdiction over permit). See also 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2(e) (defining term "fill material").
106. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 644 (describing possible interpretation
that would deny Corps jurisdiction and effectively reject proposal altogether). See
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The Ninth Circuit interpreted the conflicting regulations in
favor of SEACC for three reasons. First, the court stated that the
conflict could be resolved by a plain language reading of the
CWA.10 7 Second, the court reviewed the regulatory history of the
term "fill material" and determined that neither the EPA nor the
Corps intended for any waste products governed by effluent limitations to be considered fill material for regulatory purposes.10 8 Finally, the court believed the regulation prohibiting waste product
discharges from froth-flotation mills governed because it is a more
specific regulation than the general definition of "fill material."' 10 9
A.

Plain Language Reading of the CWA

In reading the CWA, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Act's
plain language to require Section 402 to govern the Kensington
Mine proposal. 110 The CWA begins by making the discharge of any
pollutant presumptively unlawful, except when in compliance with
Sections 301, 306, 402 and 404.111 Further, the CWA requires the
EPA to implement "increasingly stringent, technology-based effluent limitations for point sources."' 1 2 Each time the EPA enforces a
new effluent limitation, the limitation applies "'to all point sources

also Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. pt. 440.104(b) (1)
(2008) (permitting no discharge of process wastewater from froth flotation mills
into navigable waters of United States).
107. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 644-48 (discussing plain language interpretation of CWA). For a further discussion of the Court's plain reading of the
CWA, see infra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
108. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 644, 648-53 (discussing regulatory history
of term fill material). For a further discussion of the court's interpretation of the
regulatory history, see infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text. Congress defines
'effluent limitation' as "any restriction established by a stated or government
agency on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological,
and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2006).
109. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 654 (discussing weight of precise and
specific regulations). For a further discussion of the court's distinction based on
the specificity of the regulations, see infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
110. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 644-48 (explaining plain language of
CWA).
111. See id. (discussing CWA § 301). For the relevant text of the CWA, see 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342 and 1344.
112. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 645. "The term 'point source' means any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
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of discharge of pollutants in accordance with the provisions of the
statute." 113
The Kensington Gold Mine project is considered a new point
source, meaning the EPA is required "to implement even more
stringent 'standards of performance"' under Section 306.114 Congress intended Sections 301 and 306 to be "absolute prohibitions."115 As a result, Section 306 does not permit a variance for the
16
Kensington Gold Mine project.
The CWA established two permit programs to enforce compliance with the Act. 11 7 The EPA may permit a discharge through the
NPDES program, "but only if it complies with [Sections] 301 and
306."11 Additionally, the Corps has jurisdiction under a secondary
permit program to issue permits "for the discharge of dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 119
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Section 404 permitting
scheme is ancillary to the NPDES program outlined in Section 402;
the 404 program should therefore not include the discharge of pollutants, even if those pollutants conform to the fill material definition. 120 To determine congressional intent, the court focused on
the use of the word "and" in Section 301.121 In this context, "and"
implied that "Congress intended for effluent limitations and standards of performance to apply to all applicable discharges, even
those that facially qualify for permitting under [Section] 404."122
113. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 645 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (e) with court
providing emphasis).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b). The Kensington Gold Mine project qualifies as a
new point source because it requires construction to be "commenced after the
publication of proposed regulations prescribing a standard of performance under
[the CWA]." See id. § 1316(a) (2) (defining "new source").
115. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 645 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977)); see also S.REP. No. 92-515, at 58 (1971) (stating
Congressional intent of §§ 301, 306).
116. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 645-46 (permitting no exception to standard of performance).
117. See id. at 646 (describing NPDES permit system under § 402 and Corps
permitting system under § 404).
118. Id. (describing NPDES permit system under § 402).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (defining Corps' jurisdiction).
120. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 646 (concluding permit program applies
only to dredged or fill material).
121. See id. (explaining effect of word "and" in 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). The text
of § 301 (a) reads, "Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306,
307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added).
122. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 646 (explaining congressional intent). The
court suggested that if the Act contained the word "or" instead of "and," the
named parts of the CWA could be viewed separately. Id.
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Further, Section 301(e) applies the EPA's effluent limitations
to all discharges and Section 306(e) prohibits all discharges that do
not comply with the EPA's performance standards.1 23 Responding
to the Corps' arguments, the Ninth Circuit expressly refused to
make any negative inference that Section 404 "contains an implied
exception to the requirements of [Sections] 301 and 306 whenever
a proposed discharge would meet the agencies' regulatory definition of 'fill material."'1 2 4 Additionally, the court found that the defendants' interpretation of Section 404 as an implied exception
"would render [Sections] 301(e) and 306(e) effectively
25
meaningless." 1

Finally, the court looked to the explicit exceptions enumerated
within Section 404.126 While Section 404 exempts certain activities
from regulation under the relevant CWA provisions, "mining is not
listed as an exempt activity."'127 The court determined that "the
lack of any explicit exception to [Sections] 301 and 306 within [Section] 404, and the lack of an exception for process wastewater from
28
mines, is strong evidence that Congress did not intend one."'
B.

Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material"

The court eventually turned its analysis to the regulatory history of the term "fill material" as it considered whether Section
404's grant of power to the Corps to regulate the discharge of fill
material was meant to "replace the [EPA-created] performance
123. See id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(e), 1316(e)).
124. Id. (disagreeing with defendants' argument that § 404 contains implied
exception). The court relied on Supreme Court precedent to support this contention, writing, "Exceptions to clearly delineated statutes will be implied only where
essential to prevent 'absurd results' or consequences obviously at variance with the
policy of the enactment as a whole." Id. (citing United States v. Rutheford, 442 U.S.
544 (1979)).
125. Id. at 646-47 (determining defendants' interpretation renders §§ 301(e)
and 306(e) meaningless).
126. See id. at 648 (finding no explicit exception to effluent limitations or
performance standards).
127. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 648 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2006)). Exempted discharges include those which relate to "agricultural activities and road
construction, among others." Id. For the complete list of exempted discharges,
see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2006).
128. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 648 (finding lack of explicit exception for
process wastewater from mines in § 404 to be evidence Congress did not intend

such exception). "Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a
general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Id. (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,
446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009

15

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,LAW
Vol. 20,
Iss. 2 [2009], Art.
6
VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
JouRNAL
[Vol.

322

XX: p. 307

standard for froth-flotation mills."'1 29 The Corps and the EPA used

conflicting definitions of "fill material" throughout much of the
CWA's history before coming together on the issue in 1986 under a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).130 The MOA had problems
of its own, however, causing the two agencies to promulgate a joint
definition of "fill material" in 2002.131
1. Problems with Differing Definitions Between Agencies
The Corps first defined the term "fill material" in 1975 using
an effects-based test, considering any pollutant that replaced "an
aquatic area with dry land or [changed] the bottom elevation of a
water body for any purpose" to be "fill material. ' 132 While the EPA
almost immediately adopted the same test, the Corps changed their
definition two years later to a purpose-based test, where "any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste" would
be considered "fill material." 13 3 For almostnine years, the agencies
issued permits under the CWA despite the differing definitions.1 34
The Ninth Circuit found the agencies' regulatory history under
the contrasting interpretations of "fill material" to be instructive for
the current issue. 135 Where certain pollutants had the effect of raising the bottom elevation of navigable waters, the Corps did not regulate those pollutants because they did not fit the purpose-based
definition of "fill material. ' 136 Instead, the EPA controlled under

129. Id. (discussing regulatory history of term "fill material"). The CWA does
not define "fill material" itself; the Act "left that term to the Corps and EPA to
define." Id. at 649.
130. For a discussion of the history of the agencies' conflicting definitions of
"fill material," see supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text. See also Southeast
Alaska, 486 F.3d at 650 (discussing Memorandum of Agreement between EPA and

Corps).
131. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 650 (discussing EPA and Corps' current
joint definition of "fill material").
132. Id. at 649 (quoting Corps' original definition of "fill material" published
in 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,325 (July 25, 1975)).
133. Id. at 650 (quoting Corps' revised definition of "fill material" originally
published in 42 Fed. Reg 37,122, 37,145 (July 19, 1977)). For a detailed history of
the reasoning behind the agencies' choices for their respective regulatory definitions, see supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
134. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 650 (explaining agencies used differing
definitions for "fill material" until Memorandum of Agreement in 1986).
135. See id. at 649-50 (analyzing approach of EPA and Corps during period
where agencies used differing definitions for "fill material").
136. See id. at 650 (explaining EPA regulated industrial wastes under § 402,
even when discharging such materials could raise bottom elevation of water body).
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Section 402, prioritizing effluent limitations and performance
standards.1

37

2. Joint Definition Provides Resolution
The court continued its analysis by examining the interplay between the EPA and the Corps after the agencies adopted the
MOA. 138 According to the court, the MOA simply formalized both
agencies' practice, which deferred jurisdiction of all industrial pollutants to the EPA under Section 402.139 After the adoption of the
MOA, "the Corps continually declined to exercise jurisdiction over
140
mine tailings."'
In 2002, the agencies adopted joint regulatory definitions of
the terms "fill material" and "discharge of fill material."' 4 1 Examining the Federal Register and a Joint Response to Comments to the
proposed rule, the court concluded that "the agencies clearly intended to exclude discharges subject to effluent limitations or performance standards from the new definition of 'fill material.' "142
C.

The Specificity of the EPA's Froth-Flotation Standard of
Performance

The Ninth Circuit also determined that "the performance standard governs because it is more specific," meaning the EPA'sjuris137. See id. (noting EPA continued to regulate industrial wastes under § 402,
even when those wastes had effect of raising bottom elevation of body of water).
138. See id. at 650-51 (analyzing interplay between EPA and Corps after agencies adopted MOA). For a further discussion of the agencies' practice under the
MOA, see supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
139. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 650 (noting MOA as formal adoption of
practice deferring jurisdiction to EPA under § 402).
140. Id. (noting Corps' practice of declining jurisdiction over mine tailings).
141. See id. at 650-51 (quoting C.F.R. definitions of "fill material" and "discharge of fill material"). For the actual definitions of these terms, see supra notes
79-91 and accompanying text.
142. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 651-52 (concluding agencies' intent to exclude discharges subject to effluent limitations and performance standards from
new definition of "fill material"). The court emphasized that the new definition
does not "change any determination [the EPA and Corps] have made regarding
discharges that are subject to an effluent limitation guideline and standards, which
will continue to be regulated under section 402 of the CWA." Id. (quoting Final
Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material" and "Discharge of Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129-01, 31,135 (May 9, 2002)). Further,
the court highlighted that despite the new rule regarding "fill material," "[I]f EPA
has previously determined that certain materials are subject to an [effluent limitation guideline] under specific circumstances, then that determination remains
valid." Id. (quoting EPA/Corps, Joint Response to Comments 12). The new definition of 'fill material' therefore does not include mining-related materials subject
to effluent limitations and standards of performance.
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diction supersedes the Corps' due to the specificity of the
regulation involved. 143 In comparing the two regulations, the court
found that the fill rule "pertains to fill material generally, [while]
144
the performance standard covers froth-flotation mills precisely."'
As a result, the new, "more general fill rule cannot supersede the
narrow, precise, and specific performance standard for froth-flotation mills."

145

V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Southeast Alaska has gained attention from both environmental

46

and industrial advocates.1 47 Al-

though the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, the
issue presented is not one of contention among the circuit
courts. 14 8 Instead, the issue for the Court to review hinges on the

149
sufficiency of the Ninth Circuit's analysis.
Specifically, the Supreme Court will review the plain language
interpretation of the CWA in the Ninth Circuit's decision. 50 Further, questions linger about Southeast Alaska's relation to binding

143. See id. at 654 (concluding performance standard should govern because
it is more specific than § 404). The Court relied on a "basic principle of regulatory
interpretation" that a specific regulation will not be swallowed by a later regulation
that covers a broader spectrum. See id. (citing Radzanower v. Touch Ross & Co., 426
U.S. 148 (1976)).
144. Id. (contrasting fill rule from performance standard).
145. Id. (concluding froth flotation mill governs because it was enacted first
and is more specific than fill rule).
146. See SOUTHEAST ALAsKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, CLEAN WATER ACT
THREATENED BY KENSINGTON MINE: SUPREME COURT TO HEAR CASE ON LAKE DUMPING OF TAILING (2008), http://www.seacc.org/pressroom/kensington-mine-threatens-clean-water-act-07-08.pdf (reviewing environmental aspects at stake in case).
147. See News Release, Coeur D'Alene, Coeur Receives Ruling on Kensington
Gold Mine, March 17, 2007 (on file with author) (announcing ruling of Ninth
Circuit against gold mine).
148. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 6, 11-12, Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Nos. 08-984, 07-990 (U.S.
May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents]. While the Solicitor General
agreed with the petitioners that the Ninth Circuit erred in its analysis, the Solicitor
General stated, "There is, however, no division among the courts of appeals on
[the] question. And while the question presented is important, it does not appear
to be sufficiently important to warrant this Court's review at this time." Id. at 6.
The Solicitor General went on to state that if the Supreme Court did grant certiorari, "the government would support the position of the petitioners." Id. For a
discussion of the Solicitor General's faulty logic in coming to this conclusion, see
infta notes 146-47 and supra notes 149-204 and accompanying text.
149. See Schwartz, supra note 2 (stating issue for Supreme Court review).
150. See id. (determining issue before Court rests on interpretation of CWA).
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precedent interpreting the CWA.1 5' Finally, the decision may have
1 52
altered the path of more than thirty-five years of CWA regulation.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Plain Language Interpretation of the
CWA
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on what it referred to as "the
plain language of the Clean Water Act."153 Much of the petitioners'
briefs requesting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari assert that
the Ninth Circuit improperly interpreted the CWA. 154 As the Ninth
Circuit insisted, however, the plain language of the CWA supports
55
the court's holding.1
The EPA, through Section 402, governs the permitting of effluent discharges "[e]xcept as provided in sections [318 and 404] ."156
Upon a singular reading of Section 402, the word "except" suggests
that the EPA does not govern permit proposals that fall under Section 404 guidelines. 157 Section 402, however, is part of the CWA as
a whole, and the CWA must be read in its entirety to fully understand its intent.1 58 Critics of the Southeast Alaska opinion mistakenly
59
read Section 402 alone, separating it from the CWA backdrop.'
151. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18-19, State of Alaska v. Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council, No. 07-990 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Brief of
Petitioners] (arguing Ninth Circuit did not follow precedent).
152. Compare Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 14-16 (contending
Ninth Circuit decision did not alter course of regulatory practices between EPA
and Corps), with Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 17-27 (contending Ninth
Circuit's decision conflicts with established practice of EPA and Corps).
153. Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d 638,
644-47 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing plain language of CWA).
154. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 15 (believing Ninth Circuit improperly interpreted CWA).
155. See Sandra Sutak, Note, Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers: The Ninth Circuit Restricts the Corps' Authority to Permit
Dischargeof Fill Material Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 21 TUL. ENV-rL. L.J.
151, 162-63 (2007) (finding support for Ninth Circuit's ruling in text of CWA).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (stating EPA's role).
157. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 4 (determining § 402 and
§ 404 permit programs to be "mutually exclusive").
158. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 646 (explaining proper way to read
CWA). The Ninth Circuit, citing United States v. Rutheford, 442 U.S. 544, 552
(1979), wrote: "Exceptions [like Section 404] to clearly delineated statutes will be
implied only where essential to prevent 'absurd results' or consequences obviously
at variance with the policy of the enactment as a whole." Id. Under this principle,
§ 404 cannot be read without the backdrop of the CWA as a whole, which specifically grants the EPA authority over effluents. Id. at 647
159. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 4 (interpreting § 404's authority based singularly on particular phrase in § 402).
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Read in its entirety, the CWA highlights the importance of
point sources and performance regulations standards. 160 Section
306(e) prohibits "any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.' 161 The Kensington Gold Mine proposal signals
a "new source" of pollution. 162 While tailings from the Kensington
mine may fall within the broad definition of "fill material," they are
equally considered effluent.1 63 The EPA has a specific regulation
prohibiting the discharge of materials processed at a froth-flotation
facility into waters of the United States. 16 4 There can be no reading
of the CWA which suggests Section 404 exempts froth-flotation
mines from this prohibition simply because the tailings may constitute "fill material." 16 5 As a result, the Ninth Circuit correctly inter1 66
preted the CWA's plain language.
B.

Relation to Precedent

The Ninth Circuit did not probe too deeply into case law when
it concluded the Corps overstepped its jurisdiction in Southeast
Alaska.1 67 This is because no major case interpreting the CWA gives
strong guidance on the issue.' 68 Both Coeur and the State of
Alaska rely heavily on Rapanos and Kentuckians in their respective

160. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316, 1342, 1344 (providing relevant
guidelines for CWA enforcement).
161. Id. § 1316(e) (stating prohibitions).
162. See id. § 1316(a)(2) (defining "new source"). For a discussion of the
Kensington mine's qualification as a new source, see supra note 114.
163. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 647 (noting characterization of mine tailings). Because the EPA created specific regulation for effluent from froth-flotation facilities, the EPA controls over the more generalized § 404 granting the
Corps the power to issue permits for "fill material." See id. at 655 (holding Corps
had no authority to grant permit at issue).
164. See Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. pt.
440.104(b) (1) (2008) (prohibiting release of materials from froth-flotation facility
into navigable waters of United States).
165. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (granting Corps general authority to issue
permits for discharge of fill material).
166. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 644-47 (interpreting plain language of
Clean Water Act).
167. See Sutak, supra note 155, at 161 (discussing Ninth Circuit's reconciliation of issues in Southeast Alaska and other CWA cases).
168. For a discussion of why Southeast Alaska is distinguishable from other
cases, see infra notes 171-96 and accompanying text.
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petitions for certiorari.'69 Each case is distinguishable, however, and
17 0
therefore is not particularly relevant for the current issue.
1.

Rapanos v. United States

The issue in Rapanos confronted the need to find a workable
definition of "waters of the United States" in Section 301 of the
CWA. 17 1 Specifically, the United States charged the petitioner
under the CWA for filling plots of land which the EPA considered
to be within the standing definition of "waters of the United
States. ' 172 In a plurality decision, the Court significantly narrowed
the definition and remanded the case for determination as to
whether the land in question could be considered "waters of the
73
United States."
While the Rapanos opinion deals with interpreting the CWA
and the permitting powers of the EPA and the Corps, the case is
inapplicable to the issue in Southeast Alaska.174 In Rapanos, the
Court's decision "did not even remotely involve, let alone purport
to decide, whether the Corps' section 404 permitting authority ex1 75
tends to discharges that are subject to EPA effluent limitations."
Instead, the Court focused on defining an essential term in the
CWA's text that had been the source of numerous conflicting opin169. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 17-21 (purporting there to
be relevance in Rapanos and Kentuckians for case at bar).
170. See id. at 12-14 (distinguishing both Rapanos and Kentuckians from case at
bar).
171. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (stating issue for
consideration before Court). Prior to Rapanos, the Court had twice narrowed the
definition of 'waters of the United States.' See id. at 724-27 (discussing Court's
decisions in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) and
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. US. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001)). The Rapanos decision was hailed as the final segment of a CWA "trilogy"
for the Supreme Court. Bloom, supra note 94, at 13.
172. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719-23 (stating facts of case).
173. See id. at 757 (remanding case for reconsideration of facts consistent with
Court's new definition of "waters of the United States"). Unfortunately, it appears
the Court's Rapanos decision did "little more than muddy the waters in defining
the extent of the federal government's authority under the CWA." Bloom, supra
note 94, at 13.
174. Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737 (discussing necessary definition of "waters of the United States"), with Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. US. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 486 F.3d 638, 644 (9th Cir. 2007) (contemplating whether EPA or Corps
should have jurisdiction to issue mining permit for discharge of tailings processed
at froth-flotation facility).
175. Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 13. There exists no conflict between Rapanos and Southeast Alaska. Id. The petitioners' use of Rapanos is therefore a futile argument because the Southeast Alaska decision does not contradict
any previous ruling. Id. at 14.
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ions within both the circuits and administrative agencies interpret76
ing the CWA.'
Critics of the Ninth Circuit's Southeast Alaska opinion focus on
language in the Rapanos decision that suggests the Supreme Court
recognized the Section 404 (Corps) permitting program as entirely
distinct from the Section 402 (EPA) scheme.' 7 7 Yet, this piecemeal
1 78
approach to Rapanos ignores the substantive issue in the case.

No jurisdictional question stood before the Court in Rapanos.179
Consequently, the Southeast Alaska petitioners' use of various quotes
from Rapanos is futile because they are taken out of context. 8 0
Southeast Alaska does not question whether Lower Slate Lake
should be considered a "water of the United States" because it
clearly is.18 1 Rather, the issue before the Ninth Circuit involved the
administrative line between the EPA and the Corps for granting
permits that proposed to discharge fill material where the fill also
qualifies as an effluent. 182 As a result, Rapanos is an irrelevant au83
thority for this context.
2. Kentuckians v. Riverburgh
An analysis of Kentuckians also proves ineffectual. 18 4 While critics suggest the Ninth Circuit ruling creates conflict among the cir176. See id. (stating issue before Rapanos court as solely whether particular
wetlands constituted 'waters of the United States').
177. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 18 (discussing structural dichotomy of CWA). Justice Kennedy's opinion in Rapanos noted that "[a]part from
dredged or fill material, pollutant discharges require a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency." Rapanos, 547 U.S at 760 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Petitioners construe this language to uphold what they consider the "dichotomy [that] is part of the basic structure of the CWA." Brief of Petitioners, supra
note 151, at 18.
178. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723 (presenting purpose for case as needing to
define "waters of the United States"). The Court's discussion of the permitting
scheme in Rapanos is therefore irrelevant because there is no material issue in
Southeast Alaska as to whether Lower Slate Lake constitutes a wetland. Brief of
Respondents, supra note 148, at 14.
179. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715 (asserting no jurisdictional question before
Court).
180. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 14 (noting issue that petitioners advance regarding Rapanos is irrelevant in Southeast Alaska).
181. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. US. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d
638, 642 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing Lower Slate Lake's geographic features).
182. See id. at 644 (stating issue before court in case).
183. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 14 (determining Rapanos
does not help solve substantive issue in Southeast Alaska).
184. See Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th
Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit did not follow the Kentuckians precedent because
the issue in Southeast Alaska was distinguishable. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 65253 (distinguishing facts of case from Kentuckians).
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cuits based on the Kentuckians precedent, the Fourth Circuit case
did not address the discharge of fill material that doubles as effluent. 185 Instead, Kentuckians merely extended the Corps' Section
404 permitting power to cover mining corporations that proposed
to discharge overburden into valley fills. 18 6
While commentators claim the Southeast Alaska opinion essentially ignores horizontal stare decisis,18 7 the Ninth Circuit specifically
addressed Kentuckians in the Southeast Alaska decision.1 88 The
Ninth Circuit pointed to the holding in Kentuckians, which stated
that the Corps had jurisdiction over fill material unless that fill material was subject to effluent limitations. 89 Applying this analysis,
the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the Corps overstepped
its bounds in issuing a permit for the discharge of tailings generated at a froth-flotation mining facility.' 90
Additionally, Kentuckians is not a barrier to the Southeast Alaska
decision due to the differences between overburden and tailings.' 9 1
The EPA has specific guidelines for tailings discharged from a
froth-flotation mine.1 92 There is no such specific regulation for
185. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 12 (stating no court has considered issue before arising in present case). The Respondents stated, "[T]his
question was not before the court in [Kentuckians] ...At issue there was 'overburden,' the unprocessed soil and rock that overlies a coal seam." Id. But see Brief of
Petitioner's, supra note 151, at 19 (relating issues in Kentuckians and Southeast
Alaska on fact that both involved disposal of mining waste product). "Kentuckians
involved the disposal of mining waste that had the effect of filling waterbodies." Id.
186. See Kentuckians, 317 F.3d at 448 (holding Corps could regulate disposal
of mining overburden). The Fourth Circuit was explicit in stating the Corps' permitting power was limited by the EPA Section 402 guidelines: "Section 404 confers
on the Corps all responsibility to issue permits for the discharges of 'fill material'
but it gives the EPA a veto when those discharges might adversely affect the quality of certain
waters." Id. (emphasis added). Further, the court submitted that 'fill material' includes "all material that displaces water or changes the bottom elevation of a water
body except for 'waste'-meaning... effluent that could be regulated by ongoing
effluent limitations as described in [Section] 402." Id.
187. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 19-21 (asserting Ninth Circuit
should have adhered to Fourth Circuit's Kentuckians ruling).
188. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d
638, 653 n.15 (9th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Fourth Circuit's Kentuckians ruling).
189. See id. (highlighting Fourth Circuit's language excepting effluent from
Corps' "fill material" jurisdiction).
190. See id. at 653 (relying on EPA's specific froth-flotation limitation as reason for holding Corps had no authority to issue permit).
191. See Sutak, supra note 155, at 163 (distinguishing Southeast Alaska from
Kentuckians based on differences between froth-flotation discharge and coal-mining overburden). The Fourth Circuit defined 'overburden' as "the soil and rock
that overlies a coal seam." Kentuckians, 317 F.3d at 430.
192. See Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R pt.
440.104(b) (1) (2008) (setting forth guidelines). The regulation provides in relevant part, "[T] here shall be no discharge of process wastewater to navigable waters
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overburden.' 9 3 The Corps may therefore freely regulate overbur94
den without crossing the boundary into EPA-controlled subjects.
Given that tailings from froth-flotation mills are subject to additional EPA regulations, the Ninth Circuit correctly ruled that the
Corps could not issue permits to discharge these tailings under the
"fill material" definition. 9 5 Accordingly, Southeast Alaska does not
19 6
offend any precedent.
C.

A New Path for CWA Regulation?

The Southeast Alaska ruling does not significantly alter the
EPA's and Corps' current regulatory practice in CWA policy-making. 19 7 The Corps still has authority to issue permits for the discharge of fill material. 19 8 Similarly, the EPA still has jurisdiction to
control point source regulations and limit effluent discharges.' 9 9
from mills that use the froth-flotation process alone, or in conjunction with other
processes, for the beneficiation of copper, lead, zinc, silver, or molybdenum ores
or any combination of these ores." Id. The Kensington mine plan falls directly
under this regulation, proposing to discharge tailings and slurry created at a frothflotation facility into Lower Slate Lake, a navigable water. Southeast Alaska, 486
F.3d at 641-42.
193. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material Into Waters of the
United States, 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2(e) (2008) (stating Corps' regulation); Exempt
Activities Not Requiring 404 Permits, 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.2 (2008) (stating EPA's regulation). The overburden at issue in Kentuckians did not come from a froth-flotation facility, therefore the process for evaluating the permit was different than
Southeast Alaska. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 650-52.
194. See Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 448
(4th Cir. 2003) (upholding Corps-issued permit for filling navigable waters with
overburden).
195. See Sutak, supra note 155, at 164 (concluding Ninth Circuit's ruling is in
line with purpose of CWA).
196. Compare Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 655 (holding Corps may not issue
permits for discharge of fill material that constitutes effluent produced at frothflotation mill) with Kentuckians, 317 F.3d at 430 (holding Corps could issue permits
to fill valleys with coal-mining overburden).
197. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 14-16 (contending Ninth
Circuit's decision will not offend current regulatory interplay between EPA and

Corps).
198. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (granting Corps authority to issue permits
for discharge). Section 404 gives the Corps jurisdiction over permit proposals requesting to discharge fill material. Id. The Ninth Circuit ruling does nothing to
alter this authority, but simply clarifies that fill material that doubles as an effluent
is not within the Corps' jurisdiction. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 655 (holding
Corps violated CWA by issuing permit for discharges from froth-flotation mill).
199. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (governing EPA's permitting authority). The Ninth
Circuit's ruling merely clarified the balance ofjurisdiction between the Corps and
the EPA; the EPA's permitting power is no more expansive following Southeast
Alaska. Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 655 (asserting EPA's authority in matter is
based on performance standard regulations promulgated in §§ 301 and 306 of
CWA).
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Southeast Alaska merely clarifies an overlap in the regulatory
scheme, giving jurisdiction to the EPA when effluent doubles as fill
20 0
material.
The Corps is not responsible for issuing permits for discharges
subject to effluent limitations. 20 1 While critics point to the agencies' joint definitions as evidence of intent, in practice, the Corps
has never before issued a permit authorizing the discharge of an
effluent subject to EPA regulation. 20 2 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the CWA - and all of the federal regulations that interpret the CWA - in its decision. 20 3 The lack of relevant precedent
proves there is no conflict with the established operation of the
CWA. 20 4

VI.

IMPACT

The Southeast Alaska ruling carries both local and national implications. 20 5 Should the Ninth Circuit's judgment withstand Supreme Court review, the Kensington Gold Mine will not be allowed
to operate under the current plan. 20 6 Additionally, the holding will

require future undertakings involving discharges of fill material,
normally requiring a permit from the Corps under Section 404, to
200. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 655 (holding EPA's performance standard governs).
201. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 15 (noting Corps had never
before issued similar permits). The Respondents assert, "The Kensington permit
was a one-time aberration... Petitioners and Amid scoured the country in search
of a prior instance in which the Corps granted such a permit and were not able to
find even one." Id.
202. See id. (determining Corps had never issued permit in circumstances similar to Kensington Gold site).
203. See Sutak, supra note 155, at 159-62 (discussing Ninth Circuit's complete
application of CWA and relevant regulations).
204. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 148, at 15 (concluding no conflict
with existing CWA practice). For a complete discussion of the relevant case law,
see supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
205. See Laura Fandino, Ninth Circuit Limits Scope of Corps' Authority Over Discharge of Fill Material,MARTEN LAw GROUP, June 20, 2007, http://www.martenlaw.
com/news/?20070620-fill-material-discharge (concluding Ninth Circuit's ruling is
relevant in circumstances beyond Kensington proposal).
206. See Elizabeth Bluemink, Court Ruling May Trouble Kensington and Pebble,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 26, 2007, available at http://www.adn.com/money/
industries/mining/story/230664.html (explaining if Supreme Court upholds ruling, Kensington Gold Mine will be forced to create new proposal in order to proceed with project). The implications of a Supreme Court affirmation are even
heavier than the newspaper originally contemplated. Coeur has given up on all
other proposals and is now requiring a Supreme Court reversal to allow the disposal of tailings into Lower Slate Lake in order to proceed with the Kensington Gold
Mine initiative. For a discussion on the developments regarding the lack of a further plan, see infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
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undergo a separate analysis to determine if the discharge constitutes a prohibited effluent (regulated by the EPA under Section
402) .207 The resolution of this ambiguity will prove useful for min20 8
ing and various other operations.
The Kensington Mine project has stalled as it awaits final review by the Supreme Court.2 0 9 In January 2008, Coeur Alaska submitted a contingency plan that proposed to use a "paste" tailings
disposal system if the Supreme Court upholds the Ninth Circuit's
ruling. 210 This was a collaborative proposal that gained environmentalist support. 2 1' In a surprise move, however, Coeur dropped
this proposal in late September 2008, gambling on the future of the
Kensington Mine by requiring a reversal by the Supreme Court. 212
The dissolution of this alternate plan marks the second time Coeur
has abandoned a tailings disposal option that is valid under the
CWA. 213
At the local level, the Kensington Mine was expected to create
nearly 400 newjobs.2 1 4 In October of 2008,just days after announc207. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d
638, 655 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding Corps improperly issued permit for disposal of
tailings prohibited by EPA regulation promulgated under authority of CWA).
208. See Fandino, supra note 205 (concluding ruling relevant to any operation
producing fill material that may be subject to effluent regulations created under
§§ 301 and 306 of CWA).
209. See Kate Golden, EPA Puzzled by CoeurAlaska Pullout,JuNEAU EMPIRE, Sept.
28, 2008, available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/092508/sta_336770
591.shtml (stating Kensington mine now requires Supreme Court reversal to move
forward).
210. See Kate Golden, CouerDrops Tailings Plan,JuNEAU EMPIRE, Sept. 24, 2008,
available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/092408/loc_336282304.shtml
(detailing Coeur's alternative paste tailings plan that could have been used as contingency if Supreme Court upholds Ninth Circuit's ruling). The paste tailings plan
had the approval of SEACC and other environmental groups, as it would protect
the water and provide more jobs to help stimulate the Juneau economy. Id.
211. See Conservationists Praise Gold Mine Plan, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Apr. 27, 2008,

available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/042708/reg_272764808.shtml
(reporting environmental groups' approval of paste tailing plan).
212. See Press Release, Se. Alaska Conservation Council, Coeur Pulls the Plug
on Kensington Paste Tailings Plan (Sept. 23, 2008) (on file with author), available
at http://www.seacc.org/pressroom/press-releases/coeur-pulls-the-plug-on-kensington-paste-tailings-plan (reporting Coeur's surprise move to no longer pursue
paste tailings plan).
213. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d
638, 641 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing Coeur's initial plan for dry tailings facility that
Coeur abandoned when price of gold dropped); see also, Press Release, Se. Alaska
Conservation Council, supra note 212 (reporting Coeur would no longer pursue
paste tailings alternative). Both proposals had the support of environmental
groups. Id. Coeur is now proceeding with the only proposal for tailings disposal
that has not had environmentalist support. Id.
214. See Kate Golden, Coeur Report Estimates Kensington Mine Payroll,JUNEAU
EMPIRE, February 22, 2008, available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stoies/
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ing its abandonment of the eco-friendly paste tailings proposal,
Coeur announced it would lay off half of its active Kensington
workforce, a total of forty-one employees. 215 Local Alaskans are
voicing displeasure with the Southeast Alaska decision and its local
implications, especially the impact on the local work force. 2 16 Despite its October 2008 decisions regarding mine operations, Coeur
is successfully shifting the ire of local Alaskans away from itself and
2 17
toward SEACC and other environmental groups.
A Supreme Court reversal of Southeast Alaska would set a dangerous precedent for CWA litigation. As the Ninth Circuit demonstrated in its opinion, the text of the CWA specifically grants power
to the EPA to create effluent guidelines and performance standards. 2 18 One such standard promulgated by the EPA prohibits the
discharge of certain materials produced at a froth-flotation mill facility. 2 19 Despite this regulation, the Corps granted a permit to the
Kensington Gold Mine, circumventing the EPA on the basis that
part of the slurry from the froth-flotation mill contained "fill mate220
rial," a substance that is under the Corps' jurisdiction.

022208/loc249720192.shtml (reporting Couer would directly hire 200 people
with additional 170jobs created indirectly).
215. See Kensington Gold Mine to Lay Off Half Its Workers (Alaska Public Radio
Network broadcast Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://aprn.org/2008/10/03/kensington-gold-mine-to-lay-off-half-its-workers/ (discussing Coeur's decision to lay off
forty-one employees at Kensington mine).
216. See Posting of Mackenzie to Reader Comments to Golden, Couer Drops
Tailings Plan, supra note 210, http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/092408/
loc_336282304.shtml (Sept. 24, 2008, 4:26:14 EST) (blaming SEACC for delays in
opening mine and expressing fear that local jobs would consequently be lost).
There are over fifty comments in response to the cited article, the majority of
which blame SEACC for the delays in mining, while placing little to no blame on
Coeur for failing to follow through with an environmentally viable tailings plan.
See id.
217. See, e.g., id. (directing anger regarding delays in mining at SEACC, while
hoping Coeur succeeds at Supreme Court).
218. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 644-48 (discussing plain text of CWA).
For more information regarding the Ninth Circuit's plain text interpretation of
the CWA, see supra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
219. See Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. pt.
440.104(b) (1) (2008) (creating new source performance standard for froth-flotation mills).
220. See Southeast Alaska, 486 F.3d at 642 (explaining Corps issued permit for
Kensington mine proposal based on § 404 permitting scheme). The Corps and
the EPA have a history of circumventing the CWA in order to approve mining
projects the agencies deem important for the local community. See Leibowitz,
supra note 6, at 922. The two agencies "conveniently resolved [a previous controversy] by agreeing and announcing the CWA was inapplicable." Id.
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If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit, it will have detrimental effects on Southeast Alaska's local economy. 22' Reversal
by the Supreme Court, however, could cause a significant upheaval
in the EPA-Corps relationship with regards to interpreting the
CWA. 222 Significantly, this appeal is a facial challenge to the CWA;
while the local benefits to Alaskan residents are great, the Court
must interpret the law, not the circumstances. 223 Although Coeur
has rallied local support for the mine as a boost to the economy at
the price of a rarely used lake, the Court must consider the aggregate effect of allowing the Corps to issue this permit under the "fill
material" definition. If the Supreme Court reverses Southeast
Alaska, it will permit all froth-flotation mines to dump their process
wastewater into local navigable waters, so long as they combine that
process wastewater with fill material. This would effectively elimi224
nate the EPA's performance standard for froth-flotation facilities.
Coeur Alaska has passed on two environmentally friendly proposals for dealing with tailings, the first because the plan was too
costly, and the second because it would take too long for approval. 225 Instead, Coeur has jumbled the CWA's words into an argument before the Supreme Court in an attempt to destroy an
Alaskan lake and all of its aquatic life. 226 The Ninth Circuit upheld
the CWA and kept Coeur from implementing its environmentally

221. See Kate Golden, CoeurReport Estimates Kensington Mine Payroll supra note
214 (detailing economic boost that Kensington mine would give to Juneau
economy).
222. See Fandino, supra note 205 (describing positive effects Ninth Circuit's
ruling has on delineating powers of EPA and Corps in ambiguous part of CWA).
223. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 3-6 (asserting text of CWA
permits Corps to issue permits for fill material even when fill doubles as effluent
otherwise regulated by EPA).
224. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 440.104(b)(1) (creating new source performance standard for froth-flotation mills). If new point sources did not have to obey this performance standard simply by discharging waste from the froth-flotation mill as "fill
material," the sanctity of the CWA allowing the EPA to create such standards would
be questioned and perhaps rendered useless.
225. For a discussion on the reasons Coeur Alaska rejected tailings plans, see
supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
226. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 151, at 3 (stating core of Petitioners'
argument to revolve around text of CWA § 404). Coeur Alaska and its co-petitioners look to only § 404 in determining the Corps had jurisdiction to issue the permit at issue in Southeast Alaska. Id. The act must be read as a whole in order to
gain the true intent of Congress, an intent, which does not glean support for
Coeur Alaska's argument. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1376 (2006).
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dangerous plan. 2 27 Now, the question is before the Supreme Court

and it will have to decide whether to do the same.
Jeffrey Shiffman*
227. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F.3d
638, 655 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding Corps improperly granted permit at issue).
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Lehigh
University.
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The Villanova Environmental Law Journal is proud to publish
the Environmental Hearing Board Review. The Review provides
Casenotes and Comments reflecting upon decisions of the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board and areas of the law pertinent to practitioners before the Board. The Review seeks to
contribute to the practice of and to promote the scholarship of environmental law in Pennsylvania.
Consisting of five appointed judges, the Environmental Hearing Board is a statutorily created agency with state-wide trial court
jurisdiction over certain environmental cases and appellate jurisdiction over actions of the Department of Environmental Protection.
Appeals from the Board are taken to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.
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